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

CUBA

Toward a settlement?

Leslie Dewart

James Finn

NEW TREND IN ENCYCLICALS?

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George Woodcock

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CORRESPONDENCE

"A Priest in Jail"

Chicago, Ill.

To the Editors: If Father Hill marched from a grassy area south of Chicago's Soldier Field to Balbo and Columbus on that hot July 11th [COMMONWEAL, Sept. 3] he could be excused for not recognizing the police officers. On the other hand, if he marched from some other place and didn't know where, perhaps he could understand why our well-trained police, who know what they are going to be asked in court, could tell the judge where he had been sitting.

The only grassy area (nice biblical touch, that "grassy area") south of Soldier Field is about two miles down, and there really isn't any just north of the Field, either. JAMES J. DOHENY

Reply

Chicago, Ill.

To the Editors: I can see the connection between my believability in the matter of the "grassy area" and my believability in more serious matters.

So I drove to the south end of Soldier Field. What do you suppose I saw there but a fine grassy area, a city block long and about 63 feet (I paced it off) wide. There were 32 trees and 6 spreading bushes growing on it. All in all a lovely grassy area, rather biblical-looking.

I can only think that Mr. Doheny is thinking of some stadium other than Soldier Field or some city other than Chicago. I surely do not want to challenge his ability to recall facts. One can hardly think him guilty of the very charge his letter levelled at me. (REV.) JOHN HILL

"Needs No Defense"

Chicago, Ill.

To the Editors: Monsignor Daniel Cantwell, Chaplain of Chicago's Catholic Interracial Council, hardly needs to be defended by me or anyone else. Nevertheless, I believe that the criticism of him which is voiced in Father John J. Hill's article "A Priest in Jail" [Sept. 3] should be answered.

Referring to a statement which Monsignor Cantwell had made concerning the role of clergymen in the anti-Willis demonstrations in Chicago, Father Hill says that he believes that the statement made ambiguous Monsignor Cantwell's position as chaplain of the Catholic Interracial Council. And although he does recognize Monsignor Cantwell as "long a civil rights leader," he adds that "some of us now wonder if yesterday's avant garde in the civil rights movement has not moved to a respectable center position."

It is difficult to understand how anyone who knows Monsignor Cantwell's record in the civil rights movement (as Father Hill must know it) could possibly believe that he could ever be motivated by any considerations of mere respectability. That record has been one of many years of ceaseless, dedicated, selfless activity—long, long before such activity became "respectable." As recently as March, Monsignor Cantwell was one of the leaders of the Selma demonstrations, in the front line of the marchers.

Monsignor Cantwell's statement (which appeared in the August issue of *New City*) was a fairly lengthy one, but Father Hill refers specifically to only one of the four chief points in it—the one which alleges that clergymen in the anti-Willis marches were creating the impression that Mayor Daley was not willing to meet with the protestors. I believe that there is considerably more substance to this charge than Father Hill believes there to be, but that is not my main point. Anyone who read the whole statement would, I believe, have to agree that Monsignor Cantwell's chief questions are about the fairness of the clergymen's making one man, School Superintendent Willis, the scapegoat for the sins of segregation; and, even more, about the fairness of their creating the impression that the political establishment, and not the religious establishment—the rectories and parsonages—as well, had been chiefly responsible for school and neighborhood segregation.

A summary as brief as the one above can give only a very inadequate notion of the force of Monsignor Cantwell's statement. The full statement takes up the whole of a two-column page. Why, one wonders, did Father Hill respond to only one brief paragraph and ignore the rest?

The rights and wrongs of civil rights activities cannot be judged simplistically—as, it seems to me, Father Hill may tend to judge them. To question the rightness of any individual civil rights demonstration, as Monsignor Cantwell does, is not to make one's position or one's allegiance to the civil rights movement ambiguous. However he may now appear to Father Hill, I am sure that Monsignor Cantwell still remains for the rest of us the shining light and heroic example that he has long been.

GEORGE K. MC GUIRE

"Editorial Simplicity"

Chicago, Ill.

To the Editors: My thoughts in *New City* magazine, referred to in Father John Hill's article [Sept. 3], appeared as a "Letter to My Friends." It was not a general condemnation of demonstrations nor a categorical denouncement of my clerical friends, young or old, who have been part of the particular kinds of demonstrations we have had in Chicago this summer.

My criticisms were based on a long series of demonstrations we have had in Chicago, while Father Hill's article considers but one incident, an incident which is surrounded by many uncertain reports as to precisely what happened, as to precisely what either the marchers or the police intended when the march began; and which was not the sole or major concern I expressed in *New City*, a concern not about goals but about tactics. The root issue to which I addressed myself was the question of the purity of means in the political order which Jacques Maritain so cogently raised a good number of years ago; that issue still lives.

COMMONWEAL, I note, captions

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Father Hill's article as "The Chicago Demonstration," which again reveals an editorial simplicity about Chicago events which does the editors of COMMONWEAL little credit.

(VERY REV.) MSGR. DANIEL M. CANTWELL

Rioting in L. A.

Los Angeles

To the Editors: Congratulations to Commonweal for "Are We Listening?" [Sept. 3], a commentary on the Negro rioting in Los Angeles—it was superb!

We do think, however, that the editors were much too easy on "the Parkers, Yortys and McIntyres." The leader's job is to *lead*. If he does not—as is the case in Los Angeles—he must necessarily bear a greater share of blame than his "subjects."

Certainly every white American is guilty of the crime of segregation of the Negro race. But *not equally*. We ". . . solid liberal types" cannot ". . . think it is *all* the fault" of our officials. True. But those officials do have a responsibility in this area which is a thousand-fold greater than that of the common citizen.

Of the three mentioned, the Cardinal Archbishop's position is the least "understandable." The insistence of the chief law enforcement officer, and the politician, that Los Angeles Negroes are "happy" in their ghetto is wrong. But these men are not *primarily* concerned with what is, after all, a moral question.

Promoting the biblical concept that God gave every human a soul—and thus made them equal—is the specific assignment given to our spiritual leaders. Theirs is the job of teaching the white American, the "uncommitted" as well as the church-goer, that discrimination against the Negro is normally wrong and sinful; discrimination which has produced inhuman social conditions to which Los Angeles Negroes responded in an unreasonable, inhuman way.

The record clearly shows that, in this Los Angeles Archdiocese, the priests who have dared to speak plainly of the Negro's sad plight—and of the

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THE CHINESE RIDDLE

Within the month China has issued two ultimatums. The first was to North America and Western Europe and came in the form of a 20,000-word document, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," signed by Marshal Lin Piao, China's Defense Minister. The second was issued to India September 17, ordering that nation to dismantle its military posts on the strategically important Sikkim-Tibet border. The immediate, and perhaps perilous, consequences of this frontal challenge to India cannot yet be known at the moment of this writing. But the meaning of what is, even for Red China, a striking, new belligerence is hardly much clearer. That China is more than a paper dragon we already know. But of what material is it made?

Marshal Lin Piao's statement is the last in a series of Marxist revisions which aim at the same result: to remake Marx's categories to fit an underdeveloped, peasant context. The Chinese call for guerrilla war on an international scale, countryside against city, underdeveloped nation against developed, Asia, Africa, and Latin America against "U.S. imperialism and its lackeys." Not only does the document express implacable hostility; its thought is crude, simplistic, and undifferentiated; and its assertions are made with dogmatic rigidity. One further notes the narrowness of the Chinese experience from which Marshal Lin writes, and the significance of such a statement's being the operating plan for a nuclear power is frightening.

The Chinese blueprint for world revolution must be taken seriously—and yet the West ought not exaggerate the Chinese strength it boasts. For every Chinese success on the world scene this past year, there have been corresponding setbacks. The Afro-Asian meeting in Algeria fell through; Chinese officials were expelled by a number of African states (which have been growing ever more suspicious of Chinese subversion); and a number

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of pro-Peking Communist parties in Latin America and Asia have either been returning to the Moscow fold or claiming independence. Could the Lin Piao statement be not so much a confident masterplan as a desperate effort to rally the failing troops?

Nor should the West, and especially the U.S., accept the Chinese identification of national democratic revolutions with Communist revolutions, and Communist revolutions with the expansion of a unified world force. The containment of Communism and the containment of Russian and Chinese expansion were once one and the same task. But since the breakup of monolithic Communism, these tasks are neither identical, nor always equal in importance, nor susceptible to the same methods. Thus the containment of North Vietnamese Communism is related to the containment of China's expansionist policy only insofar as North Vietnam is controlled by China. While the turmoil of a "third world" emerging from poverty and colonialism will inevitably produce revolutions, even Communist ones, the successes and failures of China's foreign policy suggest that Mao and his successors will be able to control these revolutions, not automatically through common ideology, but only to the extent that they can bring Chinese economic and military power to bear.

China is bringing its military power to bear on India's border right now, of course; at the same time, it failed to bring its economic power to bear in successful foreign aid programs for the new nations it courts in Africa. That is why the former action should be firmly resisted by the West, while the latter African adventures must not be allowed to back the West into reactionary postures toward national revolutions.

The Chinese dragon is made of the same stuff as the Chinese economic and military base, and not of the stuff of ideological dreams. Chinese power, then, is real and growing; it will, to the dismay of those who wish this were a different and better world, have to be countered by the employment of contrary power. But this conflict is precise and limited. China will have to learn the difference between its own national self-interest and Lin Piao's revolutionary worldplan. Meanwhile, the West should not confuse *its* self-interest in resisting the genuine Chinese threat with any crusading counter-revolutionary worldplan of its own.

14(b) PENDING

If large membership lists and money in the bank are any standard, labor unions are stronger today than they've ever been. They have arrived in a way that the civil rights movement dares not dream of, not only in terms of political power but also as institutions that apparently have come to satisfactory terms with life itself. Of course, that is the trouble. The fat cat of the Democratic Party's coffers is very much a paper tiger in the South.

Having supported President Johnson almost from the moment he was sworn into office, however, the unions now have enough credit in the White House to perhaps make their first real penetration into the right-to-work confines of the South. The Administration sponsored bill to repeal 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley law fails to solve some basic problems, most importantly, how to add sufficiently to union power so that it can obliterate poverty (a point developed by Sidney Lens; COMMONWEAL, Sept. 17). But it does strengthen unions where they are weakest, namely in the South.

It is not surprising then that the loudest cry of anguish should come from Louisiana's Senator Ellender, who, son of the old South that he is, already is speaking of "revolt." Senator Dirksen threatened "extended discussion" on the bill, adding, statesman-like, that he didn't "like to use the word filibuster."

But what is most curious about this whole business, and no doubt the key to the outcome, is how the President will use his power over Congress. Ellender speculated that the President is "not wholeheartedly" for the bill, and he may be right. On the other hand, the unions have every reason to expect Johnson to go down the line on the bill. Yet they don't seem particularly sanguine right now. What is the matter?

The 89th Congress, still in its opening session, has completed or is in the process of completing final action on 18 pieces of major legislation, an outstanding record. However, of the six major Administration bills still pending, three, including 14(b), touch on labor unions, the minimum wage and unemployment compensation bills indirectly. The President has the power to break any filibuster in 89th, if not this session, then the next. Why then the wariness? Is it because Ellender may in fact be right and President Johnson really hasn't his heart in the 14(b) bill?

The curtain may come down on the 89th without passage of this important legislation, but the fight will offer an illuminating outline of some of the forces the President feels he must contend with, and perhaps placate, at this stage of his Great Society. If the death of the Mississippi challenge is any indication, the white Democratic Party in the South looms far more importantly in the Johnsonian consensus than most of us would be likely to allow. And far more, apparently, than the big bad unions.

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POPE AND POMP

In perspective, last year's tiara incident has taken on a new aspect. Since the gold and silver tiara of Milan was donated "for the poor," the Pope does not seem to have worn a tiara of any kind. He pointedly refrained from wearing one at the ceremonial opening of the fourth Council session, just as he has refrained on all other major occasions since last fall. It now appears as though last year's gift of the tiara—which somehow turned up in Cardinal Spellman's luggage—was not merely an isolated gesture. Apparently the tiara is being permanently abandoned.

The Pope is fond of symbol and recognizes its power—although this one has nearly been lost on us. The white bishop's mitre which he now wears instead of a tiara might be taken as a silent sermon on collegiality—an attempt to stress fraternal links with his fellow bishops rather than his unquestioned primacy. It might be, that is, if his speeches and actions were not pointing the other way. More likely, the Pope is primarily concerned with the unnecessary pomp with which the Church confronts a world that largely lives in grinding poverty. Starving people do not identify quickly with men who wear gold hats.

The Pope is acutely aware of this, though he has approached the problem in his customary way: with more caution than dramatic impact. The tiara donation was accompanied by no declaration of intent; the latter only begins to become clear after a year's time. What we now infer from the tiara incident can also be inferred from a number of almost casual minor decisions: the Cardinals have had their long, trailing cloaks cut down; Vatican ceremonies have been curtailed; the traditional ostrich feathers have been dropped from the papal train; the papal nobles have been told, as gently as possible, of their consuming inutility; the *sedia gestatoria,* on which the Pope rides triumphantly, if anachronistically, is more and more abandoned. Paul *walked* into Session Four under his own steam.

All this adds up to little in the practical order, but rather more as a declaration of intent. Reform here is long overdue. Vatican ceremony still apes the manners of a suddenly-rich petty baroque court, sustained by an overblown complacency and an Italianate love of a good show. As understandable as all this may be historically, it has nothing to say to the Church universal, much less to the disinherited outside the Church whom we declare it our purpose to serve.

The petition by the domestic prelates of Quebec is a heartening sign. They want to renounce the title "monsignor," on the sensible grounds that priests should not be called "my lord"; they also want to renounce the red sashes, stockings, piping, buttons and other insignia as needless and expensive spectacle. Similarly we suspect the Church could do with far less in the line of ermine, lace and rich silks. Perhaps they once signified the dignity of authority—but to twentieth century man they signify only anachronism and financial indulgence.

IMMIGRATION POLICY

Under the best of circumstances, a just, wise and practical immigration policy would be a wonder to behold. A policy which could see into the future and take perfect account of its possibilities would be downright miraculous. Yet if the Administration's attempt to change the present American immigration laws are to mean much both wonders and miracles are needed—at least to a moderate degree. For the great majority of those potential immigrants who were kept out of the country for over four decades by discriminatory quota systems, nothing at all can now be done. They were the victims of the accidental historical fact that most of the pre-1924 immigrants came from Western Europe, and Northern Europe at that. They were also victims of an attempt to use the ethnic distribution achieved during the twenties as a final norm.

President Johnson has worked hard to do away with this injustice. His efforts won't help most of those who couldn't get to America in the past forty years, but they could help their children and grandchildren. That is to say, his efforts will be helpful if Congress gives him full support. At the moment, however, the issue is in doubt, and the key difficulty lies in the President's advocacy of an unrestrictive policy toward potential immigrants from Latin America. By a narrow roll-call vote, a provision laying down a quota system for the Western hemisphere was rejected in the House. Pressure in the Senate, led by Senator Sam J. Ervin (D.) of North Carolina, is even more intense. Senator Ervin's objection rests on the specter of an overwhelming flood of Latin American immigrants in the near future. He does not make clear just why this would be so terrible, contenting himself with arguing that many potential immigrants from Great Britain ("our great ally") would be cut off in favor of Latin Americans. He is right, for it surely would work out this way. But the statistics of past immigration patterns show that Great Britain has not for some years used up its present quota of 65,000. Clearly, there do not exist in Britain the pressures for immigration which exist in Latin America.

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One could, of course, easily imagine a situation developing which might cause serious problems. At this point it is only a possibility; to create tight restrictions because of exceedingly hypothetical worries about the future would serve no good purpose.

In fact, a good case can be made that Latin Americans should be given some preferential treatment. The main reason is that they need, or will soon need, some alternatives to a life of poverty, disease and illiteracy. Immigration, when possible, has been one traditional way in which people have sought release from these conditions. The United States should be open to those in particular whose needs are greatest. At the moment, many Latin Americans are in this unenviable position. Should real problems develop in the future, then the immigration laws could be changed. For now, however, a policy of unrestricted Latin American immigration seems only just.

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MYSTERIUM FIDEI

NEW TREND IN ENCYCLICALS?

Pope Paul's *Mysterium Fidei* demands more than the careful scrutiny one must always bestow on a papal encyclical. In this instance the task is more difficult because the vast body of Christians are pretty much in the dark about the identity of the encyclical's immediate target: "Some who—in written or spoken word —with reference either to Masses which are celebrated in private, or to the dogma of transubstantiation, or to devotion to the Eucharist, spread abroad opinions which disturb the faithful and fill their minds with no little confusion about matters of faith."

Professional theologians may be almost as hard pressed as the general public to say just who these "some" are. On this score alone, perhaps, *Mysterium Fidei* will arouse unusual interest. It may prove to be the first of a new genre of encyclicals, one that enters the theological lists at the outset of a discussion. By contrast, *Humani Generis*, Pius XII's letter of warning in 1950 against trends in the "New Theology" and other theological initiatives, appeared only after a long period of debate among experts in the pages of practically every major theological review in the world.

The first reaction of some who read *Mysterium Fidei* was predictably to seek for hidden motives behind the encyclical's publication on the eve of Vatican II's last session. The press promptly speculated, for example, on the possibility that the encyclical was intended primarily to win peace in the Church by reassuring the "conservatives." Some saw subtle confirmation of this hypothesis in Pope Paul's move three days later to put the "progressives" at ease in turn by disclosing his concrete plan for creation of the senate of bishops they had so long awaited.

Another theory on *Mysterium Fidei* would have it that it simply reflected the Pope's growing concern over a rash of disturbingly open discussions. In this view the occasion for the encyclical was not any particularly widespread upheaval in Eucharistic theology, but generic doctrinal and disciplinary unrest in some quarters of the Church. Some would even pinpoint this by identifying the Netherlands as the chief trouble spot. They call attention to the fact that almost the only known Catholic advocacy of new speculative views on the Eucharist in recent years has come from a few Dutch thinkers. Whatever the substance behind this view, it is a fact that Cardinal Alfrink, the Dutch primate, unexpectedly took the floor at a public meeting in Rome on September 15 to defend Dutch Catholicism against grossly unfair and unwarranted attacks in some segments of the Italian press. He pointed out that if Dutch Catholics were at times outspoken in their criticism of Church affairs, they had support for their position in many other lands.

Putting aside all efforts at reading the Pope's mind for hidden motivation behind his encyclical, one will still have a difficult task identifying proponents of the opinions against which the document is cautioning. At one point, for instance, Pope Paul declares it is not allowable "to propose and act upon the opinion according to which, in the consecrated hosts which remain after the celebration of the Sacrifice of the Mass, Christ Our Lord is no longer present." It is hard to believe that the Pope is referring here simply to someone like the Protestant theologian F. J. Leenhardt, who in his book *This Is My Body* wrote that "the Eucharistic Bread reverts to its natural status outside the context of the sacramental action." Yet, aside from this work and rumors appearing in such untheological sources as *Time* magazine, even well-informed individuals know of no scholars who in fact advocate such a view.

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Certainly the English Catholic theologian Charles Davis has proposed a view that differs significantly from Leenhardt's on the crucial point. In an article on "The Theology of Transubstantiation" in the April 1964 issue of *Sophia,* (a publication from the University of Melbourne), Father Davis does state that "transubstantiation is not a change of physical substance but a change of finality; a change in what this thing called bread means and does for man, and consequently a change in what it is for man." Yet he insists in the same essay that "the new divine meaning involves an objective displacement of the human meaning. There is therefore only one meaning and only one reality. The Eucharistic Bread, the vehicle of Christ's Presence, remains such for as long as the sacramental symbolism endures."

Again, there will be questioning as to those whose writings on the "dogma of transubstantiation" cause "no little confusion." It is most unlikely that the encyclical is intended as a rebuke, at this point, against a Protestant like Max Thurian of Taizé. This theologian, who has been warmly welcomed at every level in Catholic circles, wrote some years ago that "in the Catholic theology of the Eucharist, the dogma of transubstantiation is not an essential one." Thurian went on to explain that in his view transubstantiation was a formulation of the Middle Ages, one whose "sole purpose was to express the mystery of the Real Presence in an understandable way to the men of this period."

Among contemporary Catholic theologians writing in English on the Eucharist, notably Charles Davis, Herbert McCabe, O. P. (*Clergy Review* for December 1964), or James Quinn, S. J. (*The Month* for April and May of 1965), one finds no rejecting or ignoring of the Council of Trent on transubstantiation. The heart of Trent's teaching here is: "By the consecration of the bread and wine there takes place the conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the Body of Christ Our Lord. . . . This conversion is aptly and properly called transubstantiation by the Holy Catholic Church." Father McCabe, in the wake of a tempest of controversy occasioned by his article, wrote in fact that "a denial of transubstantiation cannot form any part of Catholic theology." It would seem clear that the theologians in question have no intention of overthrowing the teaching of Trent, then. It is likewise true, however, that they have engaged in the delicate and (to quote the encyclical) "praiseworthy effort" of investigating the mystery of the Eucharist in the light of new or recaptured insights.

The whole of sacramental theology has of late undergone exciting development under the impact of two renewed theological emphases: one, a stress on the community or ecclesial dimension of the sacramental system; the other, a heightened awareness of the personal relationships involved in sacramental "encounters" between Christ and the Christian. Much of this development has stemmed from the almost revolutionary "return to sources" made possible by recent advances in biblical and patristic scholarship.

Speculative thought on the sacraments, as well as in other areas of theology, has in addition been influenced by exposure to the intellectual climates of existentialism, phenomenology, and the analytic approach of, say, a Wittgenstein. The thrust of the encyclical's warning is clearly in this quarter. Father Quinn, writing in *The Month,* states that "modern philosophy had transferred the discussion of substance as a metaphysical and ontological entity to the 'existential' thing, described in terms of its characteristic function." He rightly remarks in this connection that the key question is whether discussion of the *real, objective change* that Catholic understanding through the ages had seen at the heart of the Eucharistic mystery can in fact be carried on satisfactorily in such terms.

Practically speaking, all Catholic theologians admit that the Tridentine teaching on transubstantiation did not make a dogma out of the Aristotelian description of material reality in terms of substance and accidents. It is true that in the heat of polemic assaults on the "new theology" back in the 1940's some European authors wrote in dangerously tendentious terms along this line. But *Mysterium Fidei* certainly does not intend to narrow the interpretation of Trent's teaching in this fashion. Though the Pope emphatically declares that "it cannot be tolerated that any individual should on his own authority modify the formulas used by the Council of Trent to express belief in the Eucharistic mystery," he also writes explicitly that "it must be admitted that these formulas can sometimes be more clearly and accurately explained."

Whatever the side-effects, intended or otherwise, resulting from *Mysterium Fidei,* it is safe to say that Paul VI's over-all aim is not to hamper the essential work of theologians in the Church. Though there may be a certain amount of fingerpointing in some quarters as a result of the encyclical's anxious tone, scholars must continue in what the Holy Father himself here describes as "the praiseworthy effort to investigate this lofty mystery and to set forth its inexhaustible riches, revealing its meaning to the men of today."

DONALD R. CAMPION S.J.

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ALL THINGS CONSIDERED

A QUESTION OF TONE

Worries about Pope Paul have been growing in the last few months, at least in circles that the newspapers call "progressive." Almost every week, it seems, he has managed to come up with a new admonition, a new caution. It was not so much that one would take particular exception to this or that part of these cautionary messages, although that was sometimes the case; it was the general tone or spirit of these epistles that was worrisome. And for many I would think that this concern about Pope Paul came to a head with the recent publication of the encyclical on the Holy Eucharist, *Mysterium Fidei.*

Again what is involved is not so much this or that specific of the document. One need not be theologian enough to judge the fine points of the new encyclical in order to be concerned with its general direction. For one thing, was this the time to cut off discussion of so crucial a subject? The basic concept of the Eucharist and the Real Presence may be unchanging, but is it not possible that other and perhaps better ways can be found to express it for the potential Christians of Asia and Africa, to whom Aristotelian language is completely foreign? More basically, are all theological efforts to state old truths in new ways to be banned, as so many attempts of another generation were banned in the Modernist crisis?

These points on the new encyclical are important, but the underlying issue is even more so. This involves the whole question of tone in so many of Pope Paul's recent utterances. Ten years ago this is something we would hardly have noticed, but Pope Paul suffers from one great disadvantage: he follows Pope John XXIII, not Pius IX or even Pius XII.

Many of the modern Popes were consistently negative in tone, a fact we ourselves often tended to take for granted. The reason for their attitude, I think, was simple enough: they really did not feel at home in the modern world; their comments on modern developments tended always to be negative and critical. The most striking example, of course, is the *Syllabus of Errors* by Pius IX, but the spirit of rejection of the modern world and of current developments is obviously shot through much papal literature since his time too.

As E. E. Y. Hales notes in his just-published *Pope John and His Revolution* (Doubleday), John XXIII reversed all that, and this is a large part of why he was so feared by the conservatives, whom he called "the prophets of doom." Pope John set a new style, a style which was positive rather than negative, affirmative rather than fearful. Instead of rejecting modern society, as his predecessors tended always to do, Pope John opened his arms to it and to everyone in it, not just Catholics but everyone, from Khrushchev's son-in-law to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Jews ("I am Joseph, your brother").

All this makes Pope John a hard man to follow, and it is Pope Paul's misfortune that he has no choice except to do just that. The kind of criticisms and strictures that might once have seemed matter-of-course for a Pope now strike a jarring note; a hint of the siege mentality from Rome brings one up short. The plain fact is that we expect more from the Vatican these days than nay-saying, and it is a high compliment to Pope John that this is so. The current worry about Pope Paul is that he seems to be reverting to the older and less attractive pattern.

I am sure that there are those who will say that such comments on the Pope should never be made, at least by a faithful son of the Church. But this notion, I think, also belongs to an earlier era. This is preeminently a time when the well-being of the Church demands from us the most scrupulous kind of honesty and plain speaking. And honesty requires the flat statement that in recent weeks Pope Paul's words can have brought comfort only to the traditionalists in the Council and throughout the world.

No one should underestimate the importance of this matter; great issues are at stake. The Council can turn its back on the future and return to the mentality of the ghetto: timid, afraid, choosing to live on the capital of the past and condemning all that is new; it can silence some of the Church's most devoted sons and most creative theologians, banishing and censuring all that is not hackneyed and ancient. That is one choice. Or the Council can turn to the future, unafraid and determined to show how wrong they are who say that the Church is irrelevant in our times; the Council can, in the words of Pope John, make the Church by what she is the most compelling argument for Christian unity. Is there really any doubt as to which course should be followed?

JAMES O'GARA

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A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

Toward ending the Cuban stalemate

LESLIE DEWART

Shortly after taking office, President Johnson was reported to have ordered a comprehensive study of the Cuban question to help him decide what his Cuban policy should be. The study concluded that three basic choices were open. The first was to bring massive armed force to bear upon Cuba. This implied a costly invasion and the prospect of a drawn-out guerrilla war. It also implied the risk of nuclear war. The second was to continue economic and diplomatic hostilities, preferably supported by continued subversive operations. The objection to this was that, as Kennedy's experience had already shown, it would hurt and harass but not topple the Cuban government. The third possibility was a radically different approach: to negotiate a settlement of the dispute, to try to get along with Castro instead of trying to get rid of him.

Reportedly, Mr. Johnson rejected outright the first course. The second was obviously unpromising. He inclined, therefore, to the third. But he was also aware that this policy would have been politically expensive at a time when his popularity, soon to be tested, was still highly problematic. Accordingly he opted for inaction, postponing a final decision on the problem until after the elections of November, 1964. The presumption that he seriously entertained the thought of a negotiated settlement was put in relief by the fears of such groups as the Citizens' Committee for a Free Cuba, which shortly after Johnson's election warned its members that "this January opens crucial policy debates on Cuba." It intended, it said, "to meet the grave challenge of that debate" through such means as "expanded radio programs . . . continued extensive work with the press" and by renewing the efforts of its Washington lobby. However, a good many things happened in the meantime to draw Johnson's attention away from Cuba. His intended re-examination, apparently, never took place.

It is quite possible that he will never get around to it again. Temporary patchwork usually has an uncanny hold on life. But if it ever comes, the Citizens' Committee and every other right-wing organization will muster their well-known arguments, which so far have rarely met more liberal opposition than the hope that the defeat of the Cuban revolutionary government be accomplished by peaceful and legal means. The case for negotiation has not received serious public consideration. Perhaps it will receive it some day. What could be adduced in its favor?

The basic argument is simply this: that negotiation would serve the cause of international peace and would lead to a noble act of reconciliation. These objectives, I suppose, should not require the support of ulterior motives. But to those who might insist on being "practical" it might be replied that such a settlement would have decided advantages for the U.S. I have in mind not the minor financial gains of renewed trade with Cuba, or even those of repayment for confiscated in-

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vestment. I am thinking of the major contribution towards the liquidation of the cold war which such a policy would represent. A Cuban settlement might well be the event to usher in the process of undoing the mutual mischief which East and West have worked on each other over the span of the last twenty years.

Naturally, there are those who believe that Communism in the Western Hemisphere is not negotiable, or that the self-esteem of the U.S. requires the destruction of the Cuban government. There are those who, ignoring the fact that sabotage, terrorism, air raids and economic hostilities have wreaked death, destruction and hardship upon the Cuban people as a whole, maintain that the U.S. has no quarrel with Cuba, but only with Castro. There are those who argue that Castro, after all, can be beaten without atomic war, assuming, of course, that he should be so beaten. All these would be right to claim that there is really nothing to negotiate with Cuba about. In short, all those for whom the liquidation of the cold war would be a disaster, or those who believe that *mutual* mischief needs no undoing (since it has not been mutually done), would be puzzled by the suggestion that reconciliation with Cuba, or with the Communist movement as a whole, could be called *profitable* for the U.S.

What is there to say to such people that has not been said before? How could one argue about the ethics of international politics with someone who assumes that the welfare of American democracy can be used as the yardstick of the justice of international relations and of war and peace? What can be usefully said to him who cannot understand that a nation's international power must be used above all for securing universally the welfare of man—including that of Communists? What can be brought to the attention of one who is preoccupied with the belief that U.S. foreign policy must be directed to the defeat of the Communist system, at the lowest possible cost, but if need be regardless of the human cost?

Striking a Bargain

Mr. Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam war makes one wonder whether he does not, after all, fall into some such category. But assuming for the moment that he were interested not in winning the cold war, but in ending it—and, therefore, that he would see profit in the peaceful solution of the Cuban question—is it possible to imagine a reasonable, equitable bargain, feasible and agreeable to both sides, which could be realistically struck?

Actually, there is relatively little which separates the claims of the two countries. Their interests really cut across each other's. Cuba's demands are few and mostly negative: she wants to be left alone to pursue her own way. Similarly, it is easy to believe that the U.S. is not bent any longer upon obtaining neo-colonial concessions: it wants above all to ward off the Communist dangers which, reasonably or not, it so sincerely fears. If we extrapolate from the statements repeatedly made by both sides, it would be realistic to hope that agreement could be reached somewhat along the following lines.

Cuba would undertake to pay for all nationalized U.S. property on the basis of long-range, interest-bearing bonds. In return, the U.S. would lift its trade and travel embargo. Cuba would also ask for resumption of diplomatic relations, but she might even agree to let time take care of this. She would insist, however, on retaining the right to self-determination, i.e. the right to keep a Marxist structure. But she could easily undertake, not simply to maintain the officially non-aligned (yet unofficially aligned) international status she now has, but also to forego during a specified number of years the right to enter into mutual defense pacts with any nations or alliances outside the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. would cease all subversive activities (which have been almost totally in abeyance since Johnson's government anyway), and would give positive guarantees against them. Conversely, Cuba would agree to discontinue all material co-operation with the subversive activities of Latin American Communist parties and National Liberation Fronts (a co-operation which, similarly, but contrary to American public belief, has never been either extensive or intensive). The U.S. would also agree to cease all diplomatic hostilities, specifically at the OAS and in relation to European and other traders with Cuba. Cuba would undertake the phased withdrawal of the remaining Soviet troops, though a limited Soviet military advisory mission would have to remain in Cuba until she felt safe in disbanding her militia and the bulk of her standing army. Finally, Cuba would undertake to sign the nuclear test-ban agreement. She might even agree to co-operate with an OAS-sponsored plan for establishing a Latin American denuclearized zone. In one way or another she would agree, in effect, to renounce nuclear weapons.

Even the Guantánamo issue, which is really as unimportant in itself as it is emotionally loaded on both sides, is fully negotiable—though mutual face-saving devices would have to be adopted. Cuba would not agree to the total exclusion of this question from the settlement, but she could very well agree to a moratorium of a specified number of years during which

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she would not press any claims. On the other hand, she would want some indications that amicable negotiations will be entertained thereafter. The U.S. might agree to this if the point were made obscure to the American public at this time.

No legitimate interest of either country would forbid such a set of terms. However, certain real difficulties can be foreseen. For instance, after the dislocations of the last five years it would take some effort to reintegrate Cuba into the U.S. market. But this would be hardly insuperable. The bulk of Cuban trade would continue to take place with the socialist bloc. And Cuba's sugar problem is no longer markets, but production; her sales to the U.S. need not be disruptive. The only point on which Cuba could be expected to insist would not be unreasonable: that future trade should be based on a reasonable balance of payments situation.

On Cuba's side the main difficulty would be posed by lack of incentive. The country is doing quite well under present arrangements. The economy is growing at a fairly good rate, and the prospects are very good. Ambitious economic plans are being fulfilled (sugar production is 20% above the pre-revolutionary average). The revolution is just beginning to pay off, and a reconciliation at this stage would bring some problems, including a thorny one: how to bring it off without alienating the Soviet Union or exciting her suspicions. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the instability of the status quo is enough to persuade Cuba to come to the conference table. If given the opportunity she would not hestitate to negotiate, as she has often proposed, because a settlement would permit her to curtail her burdensome military establishment and to relax in safety in every other way. This would be well worth every disruption that a reconciliation would cost.

On the American side, public feeling against a negotiated settlement would present a most serious problem. Many political interests have combined to excite the passions of the American voter over a period of several years and to teach him certain attitudes which would now militate against negotiations with Castro. No agency has been more effective in this respect than the executive branch. For the resources of the presidency for molding public opinion in foreign affairs are practically unlimited: the American press has traditionally received both its facts and its interpretations of foreign affairs directly from the U.S. government, and it has always been rather uncritically disposed toward the truth of these facts and the accuracy (not necessarily the adequacy) of these interpretations. (Public criticism, accordingly, often disagrees with the means, but seldom with the ultimate ends, of U.S. foreign policy). Of course, the Viet Nam war and the Dominican affair may well have signalled a turn in the tide. However, until this is confirmed as a trend one will have to suppose that the U.S. press will continue to put over the public whatever the current government line may be.

But this works both ways. It would take no more than two or three months of carefully programmed State Department background briefings to inform the U.S. of the new "facts": Castro is at long last ready to capitulate. We'd better take advantage of the fact that he is economically on his knees. Let's drive a good bargain, without showing vindictiveness, before he completely destroys the Cuban economy and inflicts further privation upon the Cuban people.

As for the cultivated image of Cuba as a Stalinist hell, a more "sophisticated" (and truer) view could be easily suggested to friendly journalists: "You know how it is in *any* Communist regime even at best of times. The important thing is that the civil rights situation has improved in Cuba lately. Cubans are now no worse off than the Poles or the Yugoslavs—or the Russians themselves!" Thus, if the U.S. government did not wish to confide in the American people it could always portray such an agreement as I have outlined above in these terms: "Castro is going the way of Tito, and we should encourage him in that direction." The evidence: "Castro is now ready to agree to terms which amount to his withdrawal from the international Communist movement. As we always said, we have no objection to Communism as a purely internal matter. We only objected to the export of violent revolution and that is what we are avoiding by accepting Castro's agreement to our terms." The fact that the terms of this settlement would be substantially the same as those proposed by Cuba on November 13, 1959 and periodically thereafter need not be recalled to the attention of the notoriously short memory of the voting public.

The Real Obstacle

After all the pressure the U.S. has exerted on some of the OAS members, the opinion of this organization would be more difficult to manage. But the real opposition to a settlement would not come from those countries which co-operated reluctantly with the U.S.; it would come from those which were eager to do so. And *they* can be manipulated without undue difficulty. In any event, it would not be a question of readmitting Cuba to the OAS right away. Cuba would be much more interested in the realities of the cessation of harass-

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ment and the resumption of communications than in the rhetoric of hemispheric solidarity and the American family of nations. Moreover, in due course even this could be managed. For instance, Canada might be persuaded at the appropriate time to join the OAS for the express purpose of mediating the reintegration of Cuba into the organization (the Cuban question is the main reason why Canada refuses to join).

Thus, the real obstacle in the way of the peaceful settlement of the question is not whether a reconciliation is intrinsically possible, or whether it could be made palatable to domestic and Latin American opinion. (Other world opinion would *welcome* such an event.) The only real difficulty is whether or not such a settlement would be genuinely wanted by the U.S. government.

One can imagine several reasons why Mr. Johnson might not want it. One might find fulfilled in him a classical political process; diplomats and statesmen begin by deceiving each other and their constituents, but end by deceiving themselves. There has been much sham, but unfortunately also much sincerity, in the U.S. government's past denunciation of the "enslavement of the Cuban people" and of Castro's "complicity in that well-known counterpart of the Wall Street plot—I mean, "the Communist conspiracy." And one meets policy-makers whose conviction that the U.S. owes it to its conscience to "liberate" the Cuban people is as sincere as the religious motivation from which it usually springs —whether it be Catholic anti-Communism or the Protestant equivalent of caesaropapism, which invests states with the power to bind and loose political sin. Their mistake is not caused by ignorance or misinformation. Unlike the American people, they know, for example, all about the popular support which Castro's government enjoys. But they explain it away. They perceive the facts through theopolitical categories which, at bottom, are not fundamentally different from those of doctrinaire Marxists.

Mr. Johnson, however, does not appear to be self-deluded or an ideologue. He seems too pragmatic, he is too much of an American "pol." If in the end he decides against a reconciliation with Cuba, the likely reason might be that he has consciously or unconsciously adopted as the ultimate principle guiding his use of international power the cultivation of the world ascendancy of the U.S. For he has not given any signs that he would go far out of his way to achieve world cooperation among all nations, cultures and political systems, nor that he would dedicate his presidency to the achievement of a common international good.

He does not, of course, want nuclear war, nor will he risk it lightly. But he does appear to be supremely interested in the skilful use of American power in order to *control* the cold war for the twofold purpose of avoiding nuclear war and, at the same time, to further in safety the narrow aims of American, not human, welfare. The most frightening feature of this policy is that it is certainly not cynically held. The most depressing is that very probably it is self-justified by the sincere belief that what is good for the United States is good for the world.

Our middle course cannot last forever

BEYOND HARASSMENT

JAMES FINN

In 1962, less than four years after Castro took power, a political writer termed the Cuban Revolution "the graveyard of more theories than any other event in modern times." While much has changed under Castro's regime, this has remained true, and the intervening years have seen additional theories die either quick or lingering deaths as they were overcome by the reality of Cuban life. It is not only political theorists or informed journalists who have stumbled over Cuba, but, as the debacle of the Bay of Pigs made cruelly evident, people who make the decisions in various departments and at various levels of our government. All of this should inspire a degree of caution in anyone who attempts to forecast the probable course of Cuban affairs

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and to suggest the best course for U.S. foreign policy.

The central fact about present-day Cuba, of course, the fact that makes it a central rather than a peripheral problem for U.S. foreign policy, is that Castro's revolution is acknowledged to be a member of the Communist family of revolutions, that his regime is a Communist regime. It participates therefore in a movement and an ideology whose political consequences our foreign policy has attempted for almost two decades to counter or to overcome. For some people this is of such overriding importance that it effectively determines for them the stance our government should take. They recommend strong unwavering opposition up to and possibly including military force. The permanent aim is to replace Castro with a ruler more to our liking, i.e., a leader opposed to Communism, and, if possible, favorable to democracy.

For a limited number of other observers, the inclusion of Cuba within Communism is of little importance; it should be regarded as a country whose geographical position alone dictates that we should be on good terms and all of our efforts should be bent in that direction. Any harassment of that tiny country is unworthy of a great power that has nothing to fear from it.

An acceptable policy will not be found by pursuing either of these simplistic guides. As Hans Morgenthau wrote in *The New Republic* earlier this year "the only standard by which a sound foreign policy must be informed is not moral and philosophic opposition to Communism as such, but the bearing which a particular Communism in a particular country has upon the interests of the United States." Because of the way he would apply this generalization to the situation in Vietnam, there are many people, in government and out, who no longer look upon Mr. Morgenthau with favor. It is nevertheless a sound generalization and it calls us to examine the particular Communism that exists in Cuba and to assess its relation to the United States.

A Communist Revolution

Granted that Castro's revolution belongs to the Communist family of revolutions, it is a very unruly and atypical member. Whether one sees it as a Communist graft on a Latin-American revolutionary tradition, or a Latin-American graft on a Communist parent tree, the result is definitely a theoretical sport. Since Theodore Draper has for years provided the most consistent, thoroughly grounded and ably presented notation on the transformation of Cuba into a Communist totalitarian state, his are the most convenient arguments with which to agree or from which to dissent. In his most recent book, *Castroism; Theory and Practice,* he offers a helpful summary description. "Historically, then, Castroism is a leader in search of a movement, a movement in search of power, and power in search of an ideology. From its origins to today, it has had the same leader and the same 'road to power,' but it has changed its ideology." This opposes head-on those who view Castro's deep inconsistencies as ruses designed to deceive those less clever than themselves. For, as Mr. Draper documents, inconsistencies have been and continue to be a notable feature of Castro and his regime.

Castro came to power, he argues, not as a result of class conflict which intensified to the point of revolution; not through the leadership and strong support of the working classes; not because Cuba had a low living standard; not because it was being exploited by the capitalist United States. Castro made his own revolution, depending heavily upon the middle class, but drawing support from the general dissatisfaction that all classes felt under the heavy weight of Batista's dictatorship. When he was successful, and only then, Castro joined world Communism from the outside, disconcerting not only supporters who had hoped he would follow a democratic tradition but Party regulars whose theories could not readily encompass such irregular converts to the movement. The facts which Mr. Draper sets down to support his case are the more important since Castro and his closest theorist, Che Guevera, have tried to revise history and recreate the "facts." Since Castro's tactics and what can be discerned of his initial program were at sharp variance with those recommended by the Communist Party of Cuba before his takeover, there has been a continued effort to narrow the gap in retrospect. But facts are stubborn things and if the facts about Castro's Cuba are kept in mind they will keep us from the cruder misconceptions—which Castro has helped foster—about the relation of a Communist Cuba to world Communism, to Latin America and to the United States.

Cuba was worrisome to the United States because it provided for the Soviet Union a political and military beachhead in the Western Hemisphere. The United States attempted to counter the threat implied by such a beachhead in several different ways. It supported, in 1961, an invasion by Cuban exiles aimed at toppling Castro; it engaged in the world's first real nuclear confrontation when, in October 1962, it forced Russia to withdraw weapons from that island; it exerted political and economic pressure to increase the stress on the weak and unstable elements in the regime.

There are several instructive conclusions to be drawn from these various approaches to the problems posed

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by Cuba. The attempted invasion has been termed an almost perfect failure; it was an ill design that was poorly informed, badly executed and had disastrous consequences. With some reservations the blockade of Cuba, the nuclear confrontation, was well planned, neatly executed and as successful as optimistic expectations would have predicted. Our present policy, which involves an economic boycott that has reduced U.S.-Cuban exchanges almost to zero, is presently a matter of debate.

The invasion attempt disproved the heady, ungrounded theories of those who claimed, and might still claim, that Cuba is an island of pervasive discontent whose populace gives only enforced support to Castro. Nothing previous to the invasion supported such a contention and nothing subsequently has strengthened it. Although Cuba now has the oppressive features of many totalitarian countries—its political prisons are much like those of the much criticized Batista regime—and an underground existed before the invasion attempt, the regime has widespread support. Rather than diffusing that support, the attempted invasion consolidated and focussed it. The reasons for such support are partly what is at issue in the present debate, but it is feckless to deny that the support exists. Taken together, the political, social and economic conditions within Cuba do not suggest that Castro will soon be unseated by a domestic uprising. Quite the contrary.

What We Learned

The blockade was generally instructive. It showed to Russia that we would not tolerate an unfriendly outpost of great military strength to be secreted on the island. Since the talks were conducted over the head of Castro it revealed to him the extent to which he could become a pawn in a confrontation between the two great powers. It revealed to various countries and political parties, Latin American particularly, the limitations that an alliance with Communism could entail. And to the world it revealed how close to a nuclear exchange we could come in the struggle we have called the cold war. Finally, in the terms of this article, it showed that Cuba would not be allowed to become a military threat to the United States, whichever nationals controlled the weapons. If it is to be seen as a threat, it must be as a political threat.

Insofar as Castroism exists as a political threat, it does so because of its actual and potential influence on other Latin American countries. Other considerations are relevant—the effects of Cuban policies are not limited entirely to the Western Hemisphere—but it is Latin America that is decisive. It is undeniable that Castro's victory, his fervor and his revolutionary rhetoric struck a responsive chord in political parties and individuals throughout Latin America. He had overcome a dictator familiar to Latin Americans, he had successfully defied the giant of the North and he had managed to maintain a degree of independence from world Communism even as he drew sustenance and support from it. But if these are goals that many in Latin America would like to adopt, the crucial question arises as to whether Castroism is exportable. There is good reason to think that it is not, at least not in the terms that are generally implied.

Exporting Castroism

It is a platitude to say that the situation in each Latin American country is unique and must be considered in its own terms, but applied to the possible export of Castroism, it is a platitude with profound consequences. As Mr. Draper emphasizes, the conditions that prevailed in Cuba prior to Castro's takeover provided the real force for the revolutionary movement. But these conditions included a per capita income that placed Cuba among the first four Latin American countries, a rising standard of living, an absence of intense class conflict and a working class that was far from being the keen cutting edge that, conventionally, it is expected to be in a Communist revolution. One can, then, doubt that Castroism is a truly viable export for the following reasons: (1) the conditions that prevailed in Cuba prior to the revolution vary considerably from those that presently exist in other Latin American countries; (2) the tactics that Castro now claims were his are at variance with those he actually used; (3) both his actual tactics and his presently proclaimed tactics—and even his claims vary from time to time—differ from traditional Communist theory; (4) the force of Castro's continuing revolution depends significantly on his own charisma, a quality that no one has succeeded in transferring; (5) the unhappy fate of many of the regulars in the Cuban Communist Party is not palatable to Communists in other countries no matter how liberally treated it is in Castro's inexhaustible rhetoric.

Castroism will not, then, travel throughout Latin America in a pure state, because it does not exist in such a state. It is a bundle of contradictions held together by a particular set of conditions paramount among which is Castro's own personality. We cannot conclude, however, that Castro's Cuba represents no threat to the interests of the United States. A Communist takeover in other countries of Latin America would immensely

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complicate the already severe problems with which those countries must deal and in which we have a legitimate interest. The example of Castro, however misinterpreted and misunderstood, does encourage emulation and imitation. Cuba could become an effective center from which Communist theory, propaganda, and influence would radiate. In addition, as long as Castro continues in power the democratic ideals that are a continual part of Cuba's political tradition will remain frustrated and undeveloped. The country will not develop the political, economic or social strength that is potentially hers. It would be to the advantage of Cuba, of Latin America and the United States to realize this potential rather than for Cuba to travel the path it is now on.

Given these general conditions what course should the United States pursue? Before suggesting what he regards as the best course to follow, Theodore Draper rejects as unacceptable extremes two courses that have been advocated. The first, invasion, he rejects as military adventurism; the second, acceptance of and accommodation to Castro's regime he rejects as political bankruptcy, as a "euphemism for capitulation." His proposal, which he terms "modest in its potentialities," is to rely in the present struggle, not on the Cuban exiles nor on the United States but on the people of Cuba who have remained in Cuba. Whatever transformation that takes place will do so only through them, although they will need all the help they receive from the United States and Cuban exiles. The form of aid that the U.S. can reasonably provide is continued embargo, sabotage and prudent support to revolutionary movements within Cuba. Because the present regime is "brittle," such pressure sustained over an extended period can bring it down.

A New Course

The arguments that lead Mr. Draper to this conclusion are less complete and less persuasive than those which support his analyses of the earlier stages of Castro's regime. It is true that a half-million of Cuba's seven million people have exiled themselves, that among this half-million are a number of the educated and skilled elite, that Castro's regime has made an impressive number of mistakes in structuring Cuba's economy, that it depends to an unhealthy extent on aid from the Soviet Union, and that expressions of discontent are readily heard. These and other shortcomings of the regime have been documented. But reports from people of various political persuasions suggest that Castro's regime has a number of positive accomplishments and, if it were to be threatened from outside, the support even of Cubans who now complain about the conditions of every-day life.

Contrary to Mr. Draper's conclusion, there is reason to rethink our policy concerning Cuba, and to rethink it in terms of a social theory of change which foresees the likelihood of revolution in countries around the world, revolutions which will stand comparison with Cuba's. They will develop, that is, from conditions that penetrate deep into the society, they will be open to at least temporary control by a strong leader, and will initially be open to the influence of one of the great powers. Even if domestic feelings about Castro had allowed the United States to adopt an immediately friendly and helpful approach to Castro, it is unlikely that his policies would have been substantially modified. The history of U.S.-Cuban relations and the economic myths which that history propagated were too present a factor for him not to use them. But our relations with other countries do not have the same history and need not lead to the same conclusion. We need not, that is, fear every revolution that is taking place, even if Communists are an element in it.

We know, as theory, that an armed American force, however successful in putting down an uprising, cannot reverse or long halt a revolution that is transforming the very conditions of life—what men believe, what they know, what they expect and what they will commit themselves to attain. Far from opposing every revolution, our foreign policy should be flexible enough to discriminate; to support as well as oppose revolutions; to remain aloof sometimes and, possibly, as may be the case with Cuba, to work with the revolutionary force with the intention of at least modifying its worst aspects and at best of channeling its real energies into programs and institutions that will foster the health of the society.

It may be that if we rethink our attitudes toward Cuba our assessment of the advantages and disadvantages will strengthen the reasons for continuing our present policy. But since our present policy is not likely to bring about desirable changes, we would do well to consider other alternatives. Draper's label of capitulation will be attached to anyone who suggests regularizing our policies of trade with that country, but this is a risk that worthwhile proposals have run in the past. However atypical the Cuban revolution, it stands as an example that tests our foreign policy as it applies to many countries that are being swept into revolutionary movements. If we are satisfied that our foreign policy has been adequate to Cuba we need have little concern. But there is little reason to be satisfied.

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HOW THE WAR STARTED

GEORGE WOODCOCK

The case of Kashmir has been at the center of Indo-Pakistani relationships ever since the two countries were formed in the untidy carving up of the old Raj which marked the end of British rule. Writers who discuss contacts between India and Paskistan ignore at their peril the ever-looming shadow of the mountain state, as I did a few weeks ago when I started to write this article—originally a piece on the already half-forgotten affair of the Rann of Kutch—and proceeded on the optimistic assumption that the negotiations so smoothly engineered by Harold Wilson at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference appeared to offer the prospect of a cautious thawing out of the miniature cold war which has persisted since 1947. Who, seeing that almost touching photograph of a gigantic Ayub Khan shaking hands in London with a small, shyly-smiling Shastri, could doubt the triumph of benevolence?

The Rann of Kutch has had an evil name since the days of the ancient Greeks, and for this reason both travellers to India and natives of the country have tended to avoid it. As long ago as the 1st century B.C. the author of that ancient sailors' guide, the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, warned ships' masters that it consisted of "marshy seas, with shallowing and continuous sandbanks reaching far from the land, so that often, when the mainland is out of sight, ships run aground in the shallows, and if they are dragged farther in they perish." Since the Alexandrian traders departed nearly two thousand years ago, the Rann has become an even less attractive region, choking up to a monsoon-season morass which partially dries out in the rainless months of winter, the unproductive haunt of wild asses and notorious swarms of flies. Nobody found it worth frequenting or claiming, and it lay like a desolate no man's land between the native principality of Kutch to the south and the old British Indian province of Sind to the north. Boundaries were never clearly drawn because there seemed no need for them; some of the Rann's western marshlands on the edge of Sind fell to Pakistan at the time of Partition in 1947, but the greater part was regarded as Indian territory, and so it appears on maps.

Yet it was this squalid marsh, the most unattractive land and water in the whole sub-continent, that led Pakistan and India nearer than ever before to the edges of that quicksand of war in which they are now involved. The Indian seizure of Hyderabad, the recurrent communal fighting on both sides of the Bengal border, the earlier forays in Kashmir—all these incidents of the past seemed more formidable *casi belli*, and at the time the whole incident of the Rann, and the urgency it suddenly assumed seemed extremely puzzling to the outsider.

The initiative lay with Pakistan, whose forces began unexpectedly to probe in some strength into a part of the Rann which India regarded as its own territory. There are two possible reasons for this action, and one highly probable one; the three are not mutually exclusive. Let me begin with the minor reasons. First, there have been reports of petroleum deposits under the sands of the Rann, but, though the activity of oil-explorers in the Indus Valley and the actual discovery of some small oil-fields in West Pakistan gives some color to this suggestion, I have come across no direct evidence to confirm it. Another partial explanation of a southward probe into the Rann may lie in the fact that Pakistan still maintains a claim to territory in the peninsula of Saurashtra, not far to the south of Kutch, and therefore retains an interest in this whole western region of the Indian state of Gujerat, once ruled by Moslem kings.

This takes one back to an almost forgotten incident at the time of Partition in 1947. When India was divided, the native principalities were left unapportioned, and their rulers were expected to accede to either India or Pakistan. Generally speaking, the accession was a simple matter of the state ruler's allowing his territories to be absorbed by whichever of the two new nations abutted on to his lands, and in most cases the result was that Hindu-majority states joined India and Moslem-majority states joined Pakistan. The exceptions were Kashmir, a Moslem-majority state ruled by a Hindu; Hyderabad, a Hindu-majority state ruled by a Moslem;

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and two small Saurashtra states, Junagadh and Manavadar, which were in a similar position. The rulers of Junagadh and Manavadar, though surrounded by Indian territory, opted for Pakistan, which accepted their accession, though the only access to the states from Karachi was by sea. India, following a line of action repeated later in Hyderabad and Goa, quickly claimed that the people of Junagadh were in revolt against Moslem tyranny, and sent its forces to occupy both this state and Manavadar. A plebiscite was organized, the people voted for union with India, the states were duly annexed. But Pakistan, in bitterness over India's refusal to grant a similar plebiscite in Kashmir, has refused to accept the annexation, and still, on its maps, shows Junagadh and Manavadar as part of its territory.



One certain fact is that the push into the Rann was on too large a scale to have been a mere accidental border clash. It was clearly set on foot deliberately.

Throughout the spring, conspiracy had been stirring in Kashmir. Pakistani agents, some of them army officers trained in Chinese guerrilla tactics, had been moving among the discontented Moslems of the Indian sector in the hope of stirring up a revolt in the Vale. At the same time there had been the strange maneuvers of Sheikh Abdullah. Abdullah, the Kashmiri Moslem leader, imprisoned for eleven years by Nehru, spent some time after his release last year trying to promote a compromise between India and Pakistan; when he found Shastri only slightly less obdurate than Nehru on the question of a plebiscite, he too appears to have turned towards the idea of a Kashmiri revolt supported at least morally by the Moslem states of the Middle East, to which he travelled early in the year, and perhaps materially by China, since last March in Algiers he held conversations with Premier Chou En-lai. Whatever he discovered on his travels seems to have perturbed the Sheikh, who has always been a local Kashmiri patriot rather than a puppet of Ayub Khan, for, refusing asylum in Pakistan, he flew back to India, tried in vain to see Shastri, and was instead arrested. The likelihood seems to be that Abdullah realized that in the Pakistani plan any local revolt that could be engineered would serve merely as an excuse for the intervention of Pakistani forces (regular units possibly combined with the irregular levies of the Pathans and other hill tribes) which would turn his beloved Vale into a battleground and, even if successful, would put an end to any hope of Kashmir attaining the autonomous if not independent status which has always been the Sheikh's real objective.

A Diversionary Move

After Sheikh Abdullah had put himself out of harm's way, the Pakistanis appear to have gone ahead with their own plans, doubtless hoping that any action on their part in Kashmir would be supported in any case by a revolt behind the Indian lines. The probe in the Rann of Kutch falls into place both as a diversionary move, to switch attention from Kashmir, and also as a test of Indian alertness and firmness under Shastri's leadership. India was both alert and firm, and the gravity of the confrontation demonstrated the unprecedented sensitivity which Indo-Pakistani relations have developed during the past two years. To West Pakistanis, whether Europeanized intellectuals in Karachi and Lahore or illiterate Pathan or Baluchi tribesmen, Kashmir has become an obsession. Chinese aggression towards India has complicated issues. Before the Chinese incident, many Indians lived in fear of Pakistani aggression, a fear stimulated by the wild talk among Moslem fanatics of a *jihad* or holy war to liberate Kashmir or even to seize some of the old Moslem centers within India; one Congress leader actually justified to me the seizure of Goa on the grounds that if it had not been taken the Pakistanis might have reached an accord with Portugal to use it as a base for the invasion of western India. Since the Chinese incident, the rapid growth of the Indian army has had the indirect result of shifting the balance of power within the sub-continent; there was a genuine fear behind Pakistan's protests against British and American military aid to India and in Ayub's willingness to seek an accord with China. The fears on both sides may originally have been largely illusory, but their very presence led to a hardening of attitudes which made the smallest confrontation dangerous.

In such an atmosphere the incident in the Rann, once it had taken place, created immediately a difficult situation of "face." Ayub Khan, whose rule rests on military prestige, could not show any inclination to withdraw under Indian threats, Shastri, his authority already shaken by linguistic riots and food crises, could only

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appear equally intransigent. His position was complicated by a restiveness among Indian military leaders illustrated by the recent demand by General Cariappa, former chief of staff, for the suspension of parliamentary government and its replacement by presidential rule.

In these circumstances, with Indian and Pakistani forces massing on the long borders between the two countries, the coincidence that the Commonwealth Conference took place in June seemed providential. It seemed to offer a means of reaching a compromise.

This might have been the case had not the Pakistanis, as later events suggest, merely regarded the truce as a breathing space before a planned action in Kashmir itself as soon as the monsoons began to ease off. Ever since the Kashmir cease-fire line was established under U.N. auspices, there have been occasional violations of it on the part of both Indians and Pakistanis. In May the Indians themselves seized three posts on the Pakistani side of the line near Karghil in order to protect their communications with Ladakh; this was doubtless a precautionary measure because of the tension caused by the Rann of Kutch incident, and in late June the Indians withdrew on receiving a U.N. assurance that military observers would be posted to assure the safety of the Ladakh road. The incident was closed by this withdrawal, and the Pakistanis were certainly disingenuous in using it to justify their own intervention early in August which led eventually to the present undeclared war between the two countries.

The crossing of the cease-fire line on August 5 by large numbers of armed men in civilian clothes, seen by U.N. observers and estimated by the Indians—possibly with some exaggeration—as 5,000 in number, was a large-scale operation aimed at sparking off revolt in the Vale of Kashmir. The Pakistanis claimed the men in question were merely "civilian volunteers," but this is too threadbare a definition to be taken seriously; the "volunteers" were in fact Pakistani regulars trained in guerrilla warfare, intermixed with tribal irregulars. It was these infiltrators who started the first fighting within Kashmir. However, the expected popular uprising did not materialize; the Kashmiris, discontented under the Indians, were evidently—like Sheikh Abdullah— not entirely convinced that they would be so very much better off under Pakistan's semi-military regime.

Ayub's Miscalculation

It was when the popular rising got bogged down that actual units of the Pakistan army went into action, driving towards Jammu, and the Indian army in its turn began the invasion of Pakistan which Shastri had threatened during the Rann of Kutch dispute. Having miscalculated over the rebellion in Kashmir, Ayub had erred a second time in underestimating India's willingness to accept a showdown.

Why did Ayub Khan and his supporters so deliberately set out to force a conflict this year? The primary reasons are almost certainly internal. Large and influential groups in Pakistan had been pressing for an invasion of Kashmir. The powerful mullahs at the head of the fanatical Moslem parties clamored for the *jihad* to "liberate" their co-religionists; the Pathans still smarted under the humiliation of having been beaten by the Indians in the race for Srinagar in 1947; the army officers were irked that a military regime had not long ago forced a solution of the problem. Men of power are to a great extent the prisoners of their own images, and it was inevitable that in the end Ayub would find himself morally obliged to act in Kashmir in the guise of Pakistan's Strong Man; besides, to a military leader on the edge of retirement, a final triumph of this kind must have seemed an alluring temptation.

Wars are as dangerous ground for the prophet as the quicksands of the Rann. But a few basic factors in the present conflict are worth mentioning. The Pakistani army is much smaller than the Indian, but trained and well-armored. Strategically, Pakistan is much more vulnerable than India. An air, sea and land blockade of East Pakistan would not be difficult, while if the Indians were successful in capturing Lahore, they would control the main key-point of communications in West Pakistan. In comparison with the scattered halves of Pakistan, the solid pentagon of Indian territory is much less vulnerable. Then there is the question of manpower. There are 500,000,000 Indians as against 100,000,000 Pakistanis, and half of the latter are unwarlike Bengalis in East Pakistan who can be easily neutralized. In a brilliant campaign Ayub Khan might capture Delhi, but it would probably become his Moscow. More likely is the bogging down of the war—unless an early settlement is achieved by outside moral pressure—into an increasingly primitive small-arms war as the tanks and planes of both sides are quickly knocked out. Even such a limited conflict could drag on indefinitely, and, with its strains on communications, it would raise once again that specter of mass famine which has been absent from India for the past twenty years. In the process millions would die in both countries, the efforts of twenty years of modernization would be negated, and the Chinese shadow, looming over a desolated subcontinent, would steadily darken. Let us hope the sanity of both Pakistani and Indian leaders will provide a better outcome.

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BOREDOM AMONG THIEVES

THE SCREEN

Sometimes it's hard to ascertain why some films go wrong. Certainly "The Reward" had everything in its favor. It is the first American film to be made by French director Serge Bourguignon, who won resounding applause for his "Sundays and Cybele," and who wrote the script for his new picture with Oscar Millard. Set in Mexico, "The Reward" has magnificent color photography of Death Valley where the cast and crew sweated it out on location. And the international cast is outstanding: Max Von Sydow, as a drifter pursued by ill fate who sees his big opportunity when he recognizes the police-wanted criminal (Efrem Zimbalist, Jr.) upon whose head rides $50,000 reward money; Gilbert Roland as a Mexican police chief interested in capturing the crook and the reward; Henry Silva as an idealistic Indian; Italian Nino Castelnuovo (the young man from "The Umbrellas of Cherbourg") as a deputy who hopes to become a bullfighter; several good Mexican actors; and Yvette Mimieux as the criminal's traveling companion in this strange allegory which Bourguignon, himself, described as "about seven people and five horses on a long, killing trek."

The picture is also about man's inhumanity to man, greed, and immoral opportunism; and the main trouble with it is that it's too long and killing. While Bourguignon succeeds in getting good performances from his cast and putting over the message that man's avaricious pursuit of money leads to worse sins, he also succeeds in wearing us out on the "long, killing trek." What with the heat and the sand and the down-beat plot, we are almost as exhausted as the few remaining characters who last until the finale. Nevertheless "The Reward" is not a total loss, and if you like this sort of thing, see it and suffer.

Also having a great deal going for it is "Once a Thief," produced by Jacques Bar, directed by Ralph Nelson (who did "Lilies of the Field") and written by Zekial Marko from his own novel. Although interesting enough as a movie, this turns out to be little more than a pretentious crime-does-not-pay thriller about a young man (Alain Delon) who can't land a job after getting out of prison because he's pursued by red tape, a vengeful cop (Van Heflin) and his own older brother (Jack Palance) who wants him in on a carefully planned caper. The final straw that pushes the ex-con into joining the big hoist comes when he discovers that his poor wife (Ann-Margret) is slaving away in practically no clothes in a cheap night club. This cliché-ridden movie has few surprises; and anyone familiar with old crime thrillers, especially "Rififi," will know what's coming next. However, newcomers to the genre should enjoy Nelson's direction and the excitement the actors whip up.

What's wrong with "An Evening with Royal Ballet" is quite obvious: its makers (directors Anthony Asquith and Anthony Havelock-Allan) were less interested in cinema than in ballet; and, although the film has some first-rate dancing by Margot Fonteyn and Rudolph Nureyev, as a picture it is merely filmed theater with practically no cinematic imagination or technique. Balletomanes may drool, but cinemaomanes will be bored.

Israel sends over so few movies that I wish I could be kind to "Sallah," the latest of their productions to arrive on these shores; but except for Haym Topol, who plays the title role of an immigrant to Israel, the picture is rather amateurish and tiresome. Sallah and his large family encounter yards and yards of red tape in trying to find decent living quarters, and their experiences are reminiscent of many a warm, gentle comedy we have been seeing in B films here through the years. Topol's performance is fine and is perhaps worth a visit to this view of collective farms and housing projects and problems in a new-old country.

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

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BOOKS

Beauvoir's reflections on her middle years

The Force of Circumstance

SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR

Putnam, $10

ALICE MAYHEW

The third and last volume of Simone de Beauvoir's memoirs no sooner came on the scene, than *Vogue* scooped everybody by getting *Sartre* to talk about *Beauvoir*. Her account runs over two thousand pages, a great amount of which is devoted to Sartre and their relationship, while his is a tasteful, four-column magazine spread with a chi-chi layout. But he is loyal, affectionate and disarming. He hedges a little on Beauvoir's quality as a writer ("she seems to me a very good writer") and admits that he gets a "bit winded" following her around. But he goes further than she in his assessment of *their* intimate collaboration in *his* philosophical vocation. "I merely wonder," he remarks, "what she's going to think about what I've written, but I don't feel anxious. If she thinks it's bad, I rewrite it, and that's that. The only time I have doubts is when I write something and she's not there." Thus the master on the pupil.

As for Beauvoir, this book sold 35,000 copies in Paris the first three days it was out, which raises the question of what exactly her large audience is really interested in. Mlle. de Beauvoir's lack of humor, penchant for gossip, and prolixity, as well as interminable reviews which point it out, have become one of the fixtures of post-war literature. But in the long tunnels of Beauvoir's books, there are some good things and certain testimony worth having.

The first volume of Simone de Beauvoir's memoirs ended with her escape from the claustrophobic middle class she was born into. The second was to show what she had done with the freedom—it covered the thirties and the Occupation and Liberation of Paris; it ends with Sartre's and her conversion to political responsibility (they had been "like elves"). The third volume—and they run about 700 pages apiece—has all the garrulous faults of the other two, in spades, but it is the most exposed and the most human. It is really a search for an underlying *ego*, extremely disillusioned and intemperate, but Beauvoir comes out of it a more interesting person than writer.

During these years she and Sartre became middle-aged. She had a cancer scare, and he had a cardiac fright, her face started to show signs of the void she was rushing toward, contemporaries were dying, love affairs broke apart and the future got smaller and smaller. And there was the central, public catastrophe that epitomized all the horror and injustice of the world—the Algerian War. The latter part of the book is dominated by that war; her loathing for her country's part in it poisoned the air. There is a remarkable passage which starts by contrasting her specific dismay at the torture and cruelty in Algeria with the "old mild storms of revolt" against the "human condition and the idea of death" that she had felt. Her remark moves without transition or note into a gasp of despair at her own impending old age and death. It seems more a psychological symptom until one reads, on the following page, this note of philosophic pessimism which both these disasters symbolized: "Everything is going to explode; a supernatural rebellion, incomprehensible, the collapse of all that exists."

Isolated even from the rest of the Left by their position on Algeria, Sartre and Beauvoir were intermittently threatened with arrest, harassment, and bombings, but they took their protests into the streets in days when people were being shot, clubbed and sometimes murdered for it. And there is something gallant and poignant in the sight of these two middle-aged eminences escaping from riots, dashing down from side streets holding hands, arriving panting at cafes, with the sound of exploding *plastiques* behind them. When it was finally over, they could not forget what had happened, and the bitterness remains. Beauvoir has mentioned France in the same breath with Nazi Germany and, in an interview in the *Paris Review*, she remarked that "all Frenchmen are now convinced that it never took place, that nobody was tortured, that insofar as there was torture they were always against torture."

One doesn't have to agree with Mlle. de Beauvoir, or find her not a bore, to respect her integrity. She is intolerant, harsh and superior with any who oppose or disagree with her moral commitments. Her attacks on Camus, after he and Sartre had broken, were ruthless. The night she heard of his death, she could neither forget him, nor give way to her grief; she thought of that "just man without justice, so arrogant and touchy behind his stern mask, who had been struck out of my heart when he gave approval to the crimes of France." Yet she walked the streets all that night in grief: "Everything tore at my heart: this poverty, this unhappiness, this city, the world, and life, and death."

Aside from these reflections, the conjunction of Sartre's and Beauvoir's emotions, convictions, and politics, *Force* is not particularly notable (the "daily dust of my daily life"), unless you're hooked on French literary gossip. Some of it anyhow, if you're good at *clefs* in novels of that *genre*, is contained in her novel, *The Mandarins*, and others of her books and articles. The memoirs, and a lot of what Beauvoir writes, are too long, too cluttered with unimportant explanations, records of trips, squabbles, the celebrated American affair. But Sartre is right when he says they are the most personal and the

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best things she's done, and they do provide an interesting portrait of Sartre who is inconsistent but a genuis, their own remarkable relationship, and the bit of French intellectual history they have come close to dominating.

There is surprisingly little intellectual chatter, and the same sardonic but goggle-eyed naivete in her sociological observations that has stamped her work all along, including one gem about an evening she spent in New York, away from the crass materialism of the New World. She spent it smoking marijuana with bohemians from Greenwich Village in a room at the Plaza Hotel. The Plaza, yet.

Galileo: The Man, His Work, His Misfortunes

JAMES BRODERICK, S. J.

Harper & Row, $3.50

ALBAN BAER

The rehabilitation of Galileo proceeds apace. Only the other day we could read in the New York *Times* the Holy Father's tribute, on the occasion of his visit to Pisa, to a "great mind" and "immortal memory." It is happening none too soon. This is one occasion when no argument will disguise the fact that the Holy Office came a cropper and formally declared to be wrong something that turned out to be right; and therefore the Galileo case has always been a chief stumbling-block in conventional apologetics. Even if apologetics is no longer quite what it was, it is still desirable to have a clear statement of the facts, and Father Broderick's excellent little study provides as definitive a brief treatment as we are likely to get.

He tells his tale with urbanity and humor. Galileo must never have been a particularly easy person to get along with, and his neglect of his family and rude handling of his associates and opponents make sorry reading. This, however, is only a small part of the story. What is far more important is the climate of opinion with which Galileo had to deal: the, for the most part, enlightened interest of the Curia and the secular authorities of Venice and Florence on the one hand; the narrow-mindedness of many religious, especially Dominicans, on the other. Nothing, either then or now, is harder to combat than a vested interest; and the Dominicans had a very absorbing one. They were irrevocably committed to the defense of Aristotle, whole and entire.

Father Broderick is very good on Aristotle. Of a greater genius even than Galileo's, Aristotle "using first-class mathematical analysis constructed a universe which provided plausible explanations of a wide range of celestial phenomena." It was no wonder that Aristotle came to exercise an almost supernatural dominance over men's minds. His mistakes themselves became canonized; and the whole medieval and early renaissance world would be committed to defend them.

Into this tight world of vested interest stepped Galileo. A man who used his opportunities and invented what he required – a man, above all, filled with self-assurance – he was yet not unconscious of the larger dogmatic issues at stake. In fact, on the interpretation of Scripture and the proper relation between science and religion, Galileo is said by Father Broderick, on the basis of the remarkable letter to Castelli (quoted in full), to have been better acquainted than the great Bellarmine himself, showing a knowledge of the Fathers, particularly Augustine, astonishing in one "not much of a reader."

Gerard S. Sloyan

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Pius Drijvers OCSO

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Through the labyrinthine ways of letter, accusation, statement and counter-statement to the melancholy conclusion, Father Broderick is a sure guide. He never allows himself to be distracted from his main purpose: to demonstrate the fate of new ways of thinking when they clash head-on, not just with old ways, but with ways on which the life-work – the livelihood, to be frank – of many minor persons depend.

Only one of these subsidiary characters, in the present reviewer's opinion, fails to come to life or be credible on these pages; but perhaps no one could have succeeded with him. That enigmatic pontiff, Urban VIII, the friendly, interested Maffee Barberini, shifts too quickly from the "old friend and admirer" to the "proud implacable pope" – the pope, nevertheless, who did not sign the decree of condemnation. Is it too much to hope that some day Father Broderick will make up for his perhaps inevitably inadequate treatment here and give us a whole book on this puzzling man?

The War-Peace Establishment

ARTHUR HERZOG

Harper & Row, $4.95

SAUL MALOFF

The portentous title of Arthur Herzog's book may conjure up visions of spectral figures who spend most of their day at the office thinking the unthinkable and scheming the death of planets; but actually the title conceals a more modest intention. Herzog undertakes, for our edification, to describe the spectrum of American opinion of issues of nuclear war and peace; and, for our delight, to tell us something of the men who dream those great dreams. The "establishment" is nothing to become alarmed about; it is one of "ideas and theory, of scientists, seers and strategists . . . who have worked out the form and rationale of present American defense and foreign policies, as well as the doctrines that constitute their chief opposition."

The method which Herzog employed to break through the tangle of conflicting theories is the ancient one of beard-ing the lion in his den. Having read and sorted the available literature, Herzog took to the field and talked with a hundred or so of the theorists most responsible for defining the spectrum of thought, and what passes for thought.

Humanizing theory seems comforting. Some people may actually be reassured to hear Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé—a leading "hard" nuclear theorist whose ideas Barry Goldwater found so inspirational—say over cocktails and dinner at the faculty club: "Basically, I'm a moderate man. I live moderately, eat moderately, and I love leisure." Only good, creative, life-giving things can come of such a man—a leisure-loving moderate eater. And what evil can emanate from that best and most genteel of all worlds—the faculty club at a good Ivy university? Just so, it may seem positively exhilarating to visit with Herman Kahn—a "sort of thermonuclear Zero Mostel" – the corpulent poet of those blood-curdling "scenarios" which postulate megadeaths and play "games-theories" involving the annihilation of populations, as well as a few of the remoter stars. The domestic scene *chez* Kahn is hilarious—the deterrer deterred by his wife from grabbing a second piece of cake, after she had checked to see whether he had remembered to bring home the Metrecal from the market. She knows how forgetful dreamers and poets may be—their minds on other splendors. And even if Edward Teller glowered suspiciously, his dark eyes bore witness to inner turbulence. It gets lonely on those immense heights where a man alone with his conscience makes great decisions—for you, for me.

Herzog—who cheerfully confesses to affliction by that most modern of diseases, nucleomitaphobia, i.e., fear of nuclear attack—organizes his bewildering subject with taxonomic clarity into three main groupings: the deterrers; the experimentalists; and the peace movement. Lucidly, resorting often to straight narrative of the genial pre-fission-fusion kind, he cuts through mazes of factional dispute and tactical disagreement. The deterrers – ranging from such "hard-line forward strategists" as Strausz-Hupé, William Kintner, James Dougherty, and Teller, to the immensely influential "analytic group of deterrers" among the most prominent of whom are Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Albert Wohlstetter, and the redoubtable Kahn (his severest critic, the science writer James R. Newman, once spoke of him as "Mr. Genghis . . . I mean Herman Kahn"—a joke in bad taste, surely)—the deterrers stand at one end of the spectrum. It is perhaps oversimplifying matters a bit to say that what their position comes down to is no nonsense. They're tired of fooling around much longer, and are getting fed up with the meddling of bleeding-heart amateurs—the rest of us. They're embarked on serious business, man's work, which leaves no room for sentimentality and other forms of bathos.

At the other—or left—end is the peace movement, ranging from the moderate "survivalists" who seek a political program for gradual nuclear reduction and ultimate disarmament to the religious and secular pacifists who simply abominate all war and by direct exemplary action seek to touch the conscience of mankind. Among the former are such men as Norman Cousins of SANE and the more colorful Seymour Melman of Columbia University, who has vigorously criticized the maximum deterrence position of the nuclear establishment with his doctrine of "overkill," which has been ghoulishly described as "pouring another bucket of gasoline over a baby that is already burning." And among the latter, perhaps the best known radical pacifists are the Rev. A. J. Muste and the civil rights strategist Bayard Rustin.

Between the two poles, and opposing both, stand the intermediary group of "experimentalists," searching endlessly for ways out of the nuclear stalemate, offering pragmatic programs of minimum deterrence, gradual reduction, cold-war detente, unilateral initiatives—seeking all rational and honorable means of resolving the nuclear nightmare with its lunatic apocalyptic lexicon of "first strike," "second strike," "dam-

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age-limiting capability," "spasm war," "full first-strike capability."

The unspeakable possibility in this diabolic game is that one strike is all any batter will get before we are all called out. A reasonable man, Herzog himself comes down on the side of the experimentalists, and calls for a "minimum deterrent leading from there by stages to genuine universal nuclear disarmament," insisting that the "United States has not been aggressive enough in searching for peace." Amidst universal madness, that seems a modest enough proposal for possible survival. His useful book, read as a manual, is hard to fault, once one has said that it doesn't help us at all to leaf through the folio of pleasing daguerreotypes, catching ingratiating glimpses of the makers of our nuclear policy at work and at play; though in their heart of hearts, no doubt, they love children and late Verdi, just like anyone else.

The Revolution in the Schools

RONALD GROSS & JUDITH MURPHY

Harcourt, Brace, $4.95

JOHN J. McDERMOTT

If this book of essays is indicative of wider currents, then an exciting change has come over American education: a change not only in the sense of specific innovations, but in the forging of a new relationship between educational theory and the best of the behavioral sciences. As a function of this opening to contemporary experience, we have the happy note that the book is singularly free from the inbred jargon which has plagued educational theory for the last few decades. The heterogeneity of the contributors seems to account for this: they are, for the most part, representative of disciplines and concerns wider than the schools and bring to bear on the problems of education somewhat richer language and perspectives than customary.

The fifteen essays are gathered around three topical concerns: a) "Education's Industrial Revolution"; b) "Breaking the Conventional Patterns"; and c) "Stretching the Limits of Learning." As with most such collections, the essays are uneven in quality, but partly for the positive reason that several of them are very well done—for example, those by James D. Finn, "Technology and the Instructional Process," Gardner Murphy, "Nonrational Processes in Learning," and O.K. Moore, "Autotelic Responsive Environments For Learning." The editors contribute helpful introductions to the various sections, which provide continuity and an overview of the book. It is unfortunate that neither a glossary nor a general bibliography was provided.

Even casual observers of the American educational scene are aware of the tremendous ferment. A series of large and diverse problems weigh on the schools: generated on the one side by urban poverty, *de facto* segregation and spiraling costs, and on the other, by the increased complexity of modern society, driven by the needs of the space age and automation. The present work is largely concerned with the second set of problems, and the upheaval they have caused in our understanding of cognition and the learning process.

The historical development here is a very complex affair but at least three major strands can be isolated. The first of these starts out from a deep fidelity to the experience of the child as such, with a corresponding skepticism of those externally imposed categories that tend to reflect adult mores rather than the actual learning situation of the child. Jerome Bruner's contribution on "The Act of Discovery" puts this approach in focus as he considers "what benefits might be derived from the experience of learning through discoveries that one makes oneself." Drawing on both the research of experimental psychology and his own specific formulation, Bruner's essay, while slight, points to a reworking of "intellectual potency," "rewards," "the heuristics of discovery" and "memory." This essay is a capsule version of Bruner's continuing effort to ground his earlier statement in the *Process of Education*, that "any subject

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

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can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development."

The second strand of development began with the work of William James and developed in the thought of Dewey and the later sophistication of philosophical insight into the problems of knowing. Gardner Murphy explicitly acknowledges this tradition but draws also from a judicious use of Freud and the behavioral sciences. Although holding to the need for a "structured rational order," Murphy warns us "that the nurture of rationality may perhaps lie in other efforts than the sheer encouragement of rational thought; indeed, that the rational may best continue to grow in the instinctive soil in which it was engendered, and that too clear and sterile a surgical separation of thought from its ancestral and parental roots in love and impulse may threaten its viability." A most important warning, especially when we consider the "early learning" projects now sweeping the country under the appellation "Operation Headstart."

The third dimension in this new understudy of the learning process is not so much a strand as an explosion. In this volume, the editors refer to it as "Education's Industrial Revolution" and it refers primarily to the staggering implications of contemporary technology for reworking the methods of instruction. It is very difficult to assess the significance of this recent revolution, for as Finn tells us in his masterful essay, "technology never sits still." Over against those for whom technology primarily means audio-visual materials, Finn warns that: "The concept of programming and the systems and systems analysis it implies completely absorbs the idea of materials. Instructional materials becomes an outmoded atomistic, pre-technological concept useful mainly to the historians of education." And this is not to push the revolution as far as Marshall McLuhan, who in his *Understanding Media: The Extension of Man,* foretells the obsolescence of the present sensory basis for learning.

In reflecting on the more extensive implications of automation, Finn is led to say that "It is now possible, not only to eliminate the teacher, but the school system." If the realization of such heady suggestions is not in the immediate future, what does bear down upon us already is the futility of sustaining any longer the pre-technological understanding of learning. Even philosophy, notoriously involuted about the problem of knowledge, has begun to confront the machine. But the schools still insist on measuring the extent of their innovations over against the traditional approach rather than in terms of how close they come to the possibilities offered by the new technology. It is the considerable merit of this book to bring together the reaches of the technological revolution and the frontiers of learning theory.

The stakes in the educational revolution are very high, including the resolution of our most pressing social problem: the education of the culturally disadvantaged child. Given a wide open theory of inquiry and the tremendous capabilities of programmed instruction, there is a real chance of by-passing the traditional kinds of information assimilation that presently characterize the education of children. Technology offers tremendous mobility of resources, as for example, through stratovision, and promises us breakthroughs in reading and language instruction.

We may very well be on the edge of a whole new set of resources needed to educate the children of the rural poor and the urban ghettos, for whom the escalating complexity of modern life has worked insuperable hardship. If it is the technological revolution that is alienating large segments of our people then we must make that very power direct itself to humanizing ends. Significant ameliorative possibilities await us if we can entwine vision about human potentialities, freshly understood, with the capacity of automated learning. We may be too sanguine about this but there is little alternative for the *Revolution in the Schools* is a powerful, yet belated, acknowledgment of the extensive revolution in our culture.

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One Hundred Years in the Life of a Doctrine

BERTRAM D. WOLFE

Dial, $6.95

WILLIAM CONYNGHAM

In this newest book on the Marxist tradition Bertram Wolfe brings his immense learning and superb literary gifts to an examination of Western Marxism as a doctrine and as political movement. In many respects his book seems to contain as well as to transcend previously established positions which Mr. Wolfe has taken on the Soviet Marxist experience.

His *Three Who Made a Revolution* remains a sensitive and memorable exposure of the social and intellectual forces of Tsarist Russia which turned three young men—Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin—to revolution. In a later and more intensely analytical period, Mr. Wolfe moved to the realities of Stalinist totalitarianism, which was, in its own twisted way, the very negation of the revolutionary dream. Underneath the varieties of style and content the continuity of the current book with his past work is evident. The fundamental error of Marx and consequently of Marxism, Mr. Wolfe feels, was to identify the structure of the revolutionary dream with scientifically analyzed reality.

There is a feeling abroad, which almost all students of international Communism share to some degree, that Marxism-as-doctrine and Marxism-as-movement are in transition. The meaning of that transition—its origins, the rites of passage, the stable outcome—is, of course, obscure. Measured, however, against the monolithic structure of Stalinism the present mood and condition of international Communisim seems to indicate a powerful and complex set of drives to transform and possibly to reintegrate world Marxism on foundations basically different from those of the Soviet *imperium*. Whether a Fourth (or Fifth) International can be erected on the shattered remnants of the Third is a critical problem of the international politics of the coming decade. Mr. Wolfe's book does a good deal to explore the basic sources of passionate conflict and commitment which have been inherent from the beginning in a movement dedicated to the proposition that ultimately belief and behavior are identified through historical necessity.

In the end it has been the tension of vision and experience resulting from the ambiguous heritage which Marx and Engels bequeathed to their successors that has been largely responsible for the dynamism and disunity of modern Marxism.

The ambiguities of Marxism have been wide-ranging. They include such questions as nationalism and war, dictatorship and democracy, revolution and violence, capitalism and industrialism. The confusion has been further compounded by the shift in Marx's stance following the failures of 1848 and the Frankfurt Assembly. The revolutionary and Promethean optimist of the *Communist Manifesto* evolved into the dogged rationalist of *Das Kapital*, thereby creating the ultimate dilemma of the role of human action in a social universe governed by iron historical law.

Marx was, in turn, both nationalist and internationalist. A German patriot, he was repelled by Germany's feudal structures and particularism. He admired and supported Bismarck's effort to unify Germany through war and violence, even though as a democrat, he was opposed to Prussian authoritarianism. An internationalist, he nonetheless had deeply absorbed 19th century ethnic and racial theories, maintaining to the end a bitter aversion

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

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to all Slavs, with the curious exception of the Poles. A revolutionist, he warned against an uprising in Paris in 1871, and then, in a quick reversal, adopted the Commune and wrote a classic statement of democratic socialism which was later to serve as the basis for Lenin's *State and Revolution,* subsequently to be forgotten. The inconsistencies and contradictions go on.

And yet, it is not to these that the ultimate crisis of Marxism can be traced. The basic ambiguity lies elsewhere. Quite simply, the world of liberal and democratic capitalism turned out somewhat differently from Marx's expectations.

Marx failed to foresee that the industrial revolution and the rise of popular democracy would not, in fact, eliminate nationalism and the nation-state but would intensify it. His predictions concerning the course of capitalist development: the increase of mass misery, the concentration of wealth, the increasing severity of the business cycle which would lead to a general social crisis, the role of the state, all these have proved to be inadequate and oversimplified categories for explaining the development of modern Europe since the French Revolution.

Finally, as Camus was to testify, it was Marx's failure to come to terms with the ontology of the human condition which was his most lasting ambiguity. The elementary reduction of the solitary human being to a function of the relationship between production forces and production relations simply does not explain "alienation" and the passionate search for life and order and identity which some men, possibly a majority, have striven for at all times, in every condition, and independently of the underlying economic structure of society. Proof, if proof is needed, is in the Soviet Union, where the abolition of private property has notably failed to bring about that freedom from want and fear which lies, in however ambiguous a fashion, at the heart of Marx's utopian vision.

How then explain the paradox that the appeal of Marxism is strongest in those societies which least meet Marx's criteria for social revolution? Mr. Wolfe suggests that Marxism is most powerful in those societies in which forces driving for modernization are suppressed by a resistant traditional power structure. The political explanation is undoubtedly true. It may equally be true, however, that any primitive or traditional society undergoing modernization has a "Marxist" or transitional period.

In this view, Marxism serves to protest the loss of security and status attending the decline in religious belief and disruption of traditional economic and social structures. Simultaneously, Marxism points out the path by which the lost values of belief and community can be restored in an industrial, urban, and scientific society. The fact that the disciplines and commitments of maturing industrial societies, with their rising standards of living, tend to sap the revolutionary energy of dislocated human beings and their intellectual leaders would not blot out an equally evident fact. As the modern social revolution proceeds, the potential for a variant of the Soviet or Chinese revolution increases.

Mr. Wolfe, of course, understands this very well. In the end, it was no one less than Lenin, quoting his favorite passage from Goethe, who said: "Theory is gray, my friend, But green is the golden tree of life." The ambiguity for Marxists Mr. Wolfe has made abundantly clear. But for Marx the central ambiguity may have been simply life.

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CORRESPONDENCE

(*Continued from page 711*)

moral obligation of Catholics to help him—have been "transferred," a word which appears frequently these days in Chancery Office statements.

In "Are We Listening?," the editors reprinted the Cardinal's explanation that "there was no race problem in his city." In the same *Saturday Evening Post* article ("Not Peace But the Sword", 11/28/64), the Cardinal is also quoted as asking, "What is wrong, what is immoral, that they should live among their own kind? . . . that's not segregation, that's opportunity!"

Thus it was that during the months prior to the November 1964 election in California, the Cardinal could insist that Proposition 14 was a mere "political issue." By vote, Californians repealed the Rumford Fair Housing Act, and in so doing, made it legal to discriminate against Negroes in housing. Los Angeleans—white and black, but especially white—must have true leadership before the inhuman social conditions under which the Negro lives can be improved. That leadership, we insist, must be exhibited *first* in the moral and spiritual field. And we will get it only when—and if—Catholic leaders throughout the nation exert sufficient pressure on their Los Angeles counterpart to force a change. CHARLES P. BOYER

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